



T he Pacific coast town of Ilo in southern Peruhas for neighbours two of the largest mines in
South America — Cuajone and Toquepala, operated
by the American-controlled Southern Peru Copper
Corporation (SCPP). For most of the past 50 years
the mines have been very bad neighbours.
Ignoring the protests of municipal officials and the
farmers in the nearby valleys, the mining company
polluted the region’s air, fresh water, and coastal
zones with impunity. Untreated mine tailings were
discharged into the ocean, destroying marine life
in the nearby Bay of Ite and polluting the ocean as
far as 11 kilometres offshore and at depths up to
60 metres. 
Tens of thousands of tonnes of slag were dumped
on beaches, extending into the sea at a rate of 40
to 60 metres every year. Sulphur dioxide gases
from the smelter caused health problems for the
local people, destroyed more than 20 square
kilometres of the surrounding natural coastal
pastures, turned the area into a desert, and
damaged farmers’ crops inland. 
Worse, the mines extracted high-quality water in
the high Andes, reducing the quantity and quality
of water available downstream for domestic and
agricultural purposes. Geological studies showed
that the company’s extraction of water was
responsible for a decrease in the flow of local
rivers as well as an increase in salts in the
river basins.
Mobilizing for change
Things began to change in the 1980s when a local
NGO called LABOR decided that international
pressure was needed to redress the balance of
power between the community and the company.
In the words of Doris Balvín Díaz, a lawyer and a
LABOR organizer: “Social and environmental
conflicts in developing countries such as Peru do
not take place under equitable conditions. Investors
have more power than local communities and are
supported by the state because they bring
resources to the economy.”
LABOR looked for an opportunity to level the
playing field. They found it in the form of the
second International Water Tribunal (IWT II). The
IWT II, supported by more than 100 European
environmental organizations, has no legal
authority, but has successfully relied on
international publicity to get results. Supported by
the local authorities, LABOR’s case was accepted by
the Tribunal, which then asked IDRC to support the
detailed research LABOR would need to present
its case. 
The Centre’s expectations of the project’s policy
impact were fairly low, says Fernando Loayza
Careaga, who evaluated the project for IDRC. “The
feeling was that if they could assist LABOR in
making a well-researched presentation to the IWT II,
then the ensuing publicity might convince SPCC to
improve their environmental behaviour.” LABOR and
its supporters, however, were much more ambitious.
Balvín Diaz believed that a favourable finding
would make the national government pay attention
to the complaints of the local people, and change
its lenient attitude toward SPCC.
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Changing the Face of Mining in Peru
The news is both good and bad for miners and mining communities
Mining is a dirty, dangerous occupation, but never more so than when multinational
mining companies set up shop in developing countries. Because these countries
desperately need the foreign currency that the mining industry brings, they do not
always enforce environmental and health regulations. Two projects in Peru, where
mining is a major industry, illustrate the difficulties — and in one case show how the
effective use of research can influence the policies of both business and government.
LABOR had worked closely with the municipality of
Ilo since the mid-1980s, and by the start of the
1990s had become the local government’s main
environmental advisor. Two successive mayors
supported LABOR’s cause. LABOR’s case was also
supported by the Multi-sector Permanent
Commission on Environment (MPCE), made up of
representatives of local municipalities and state
government departments, as well as unions and
civil society groups. And it just happened to be
chaired by the mayor of Ilo, Ernesto Herrera
Becerra. It was MPCE’s role to oversee SPCC’s
compliance with environmental recommendations.
The Commission members wanted to see concrete
action from the mining company, and they weren’t
getting it.
A victory
Edmundo Torrelio, of the Ilo Valley Commission of
Irrigators, pointed out that the valley farmers also
had a stake in the management of the scarce water
resource. The farmers’ persistent complaints
eventually got the attention of the General
Inspection Office of the Republic, and resulted in a
major coup — the General Inspector agreed
to testify before the Tribunal. 
This brought the project national media attention.
Three days before the IWT II hearing the newspaper,
Onda, reported “The General Inspector of the
Republic, Dr Luz Aurea Sáenz, said yesterday that
during the last three decades some factors, such as
lenient legislation and bad public servants, have
allowed SPCC to impose its terms, to do nothing to
solve problems, and to misuse water resources.”
Another newspaper, La Republica, quoted Dr Sáenz
as saying that, while a favourable ruling from the
IWT II would be only a moral victory, it would be
acknowledged at the United Nations Conference
on Development and Environment, held later that
year in Brazil. 
LABOR was able to put together a strong coalition
of local and regional forces to support its case
against SPCC before the IWT II. That case included
the IDRC-funded study. Additional evidence was
presented at the hearing in February 1992,
including a video and live testimony from
Dr Sáenz and mayor Becerra. 
But Balvín Díaz and her colleagues realized that
local support and a victory at the IWT II might not
be enough. They would need political support at
the national level to guarantee action. And they got
it. Immediately after the Tribunal’s decision was
announced, 50 members of congress came out in
support of its findings. This was the result of
intense lobbying in the preceding months by two
local members of congress — Cristala
Constantiñidez and Julio Díaz Palacios, who was
mayor of Ilo during the 1980s. 
In its findings the IWT II Jury condemned SPCC for
its abuse of freshwater resources, its negligence in
disposing of toxic slag, and for emitting enormous
quantities of sulphur dioxide gases. It accused the
company of taking advantage of lax enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations, and of
increasing its profits at the expense of the local
community.
Concrete results
While the jury’s findings were everything that
LABOR and its coalition had hoped for, it was in
one sense anti-climactic. Just two months before
the IWT II hearing, anticipating a negative outcome
from the Tribunal, SPCC signed an accord with the
national government committing an investment of
us$200 million for environmental projects and a
further us$100 million for new technologies and
equipment.
Since that time the company has built an
earthquake-proof tailings dam so that tailings are
no longer discharged into Ite Bay. The bay itself
has been reclaimed, and the flamingos, fish, and
shrimp have returned. Slag dumps on the shore
near Ilo have been removed. 
The company compensates farmers for damage to
crops, and has established a fund for agricultural
loans and technical assistance. Water recycling has
been increased and SPCC no longer exploits water
wells in the Ilo valley. A three-stage project to
reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 92% was
scheduled for completion at the end of 2004, but
the government recently approved a two-year
extension.
There have also been changes in public policy.
Most significantly, the government of Peru adopted
a new environmental regulatory framework for
mining activities. How much this was influenced
by LABOR’s campaign depends on whom you talk
to. LABOR staff and both the current and former
mayors of Ilo believe that the Ilo case was critical
in determining the new framework. 
On the other hand, officials such as Luis Alberto
Sanchez at the Ministry of Energy and Mines
attribute the reforms more to the privatization
process and pressures from multilateral financing
institutions. He concedes, however, that the mining
industry’s legacy of pollution and environmental
degradation played a role.
In 1990 Cerro de Pasco, 4,300 metres above sea
level, was the largest and highest mining town in
the world. About one-third of its population of
71,000 are miners and their families — and
according the Dr Alberto Arregui, of the Centro
Medico San Felipe, they were dying too young,
much younger than people who lived at sea level.
The main cause of death was chronic mountain
sickness (CMS), which is essentially a process of loss
of adaptation to high altitudes. Preliminary
research carried out by the Universidad Peruana
Cayetano Heredia, at the request of the miners’
trade union, had suggested that a combination of
factors led to the high incidence of CMS among the
miners of Cerro de Pasco. Many smoked tobacco,
drank alcohol, and chewed coca leaf. But more
than bad habits, the research suggested that shift
work and the severe working conditions in high-
altitude mines increased the incidence of CMS.
In 1989 IDRC funded a study to explore these
results with a view to gaining recognition of CMS as
an occupational illness by the government and the
International Labour Organization. However, the
project included no formal strategy to lobby
policymakers or other social agents.
The 18-month study did find a higher incidence of
CMS among the miners than among the general
population, and concluded that “the highly
exhausting physical activity of miners in general,
and mining drillers in particular” accelerated the
symptoms of CMS.
The results of the study were outlined in a
presentation to the miners’ trade union. Leaflets
were published and distributed in other high-
altitude mining centres in Peru. The results were
also published in an award-winning book,
Desadaptación a la Vida en las Grandes Alturas (loss
of adaptation to life at high altitudes). However
there was no concerted effort to meet with the
government, the mining industry, or community-
based organizations. The effort to gain recognition
for CMS fell far below what was expected, according
to Dr Arregui and researcher Marcel Valcarcel.
This was in part because of the threatening
presence of Shining Path guerillas in Cerro de
Pasco, which forced the research team to keep a
low profile. Then both the Ministry of Health and
the mining industry representatives challenged
the project’s findings because they contradicted
the “traditional assumption” that people born at
high altitudes are “well adapted” to these
conditions. In addition, it was suggested that the
findings of the initial study were biased, that the
miners had been “induced to express perceptions
of health discomfort.”
Thus, despite some positive findings, the study has
had a negligible impact on occupational health
and safety or mining policies in Peru, says
Fernando Loayza Careaga, who evaluated the
project’s policy impact. Among officials at both the
National Institute of Occupational Health and the
Ministry of Energy and Mines, as well as among
representatives of industry associations, he could
find no one in 2002 who was aware of the study.
Union officials, however, were aware of the study,
but they now had other priorities.
Since the study was conducted, Peru, like many
other Latin American countries, has undergone
major economic reforms, including labour market
reform and the privatization of state companies.
This has resulted in a rapid increase in the number
of miners working on contract, and a subsequent
weakening of the miners’ union. The weakened
unions have largely lost their ability to influence
policy, says researcher Marcel Valcarcel.
High altitude mining: an occupational hazard?
Assessing policy influence
Concluding his evaluation of the two projects,
Fernando Loayza Careaga assessed the type of
policy influence each project had, the factors that
affected policy influence, and IDRC’s role in the
project’s ability or inability to influence policy.
Some of his conclusions:
❏ The overriding purpose of the LABOR case
against SPCC before the IWT II was to influence
corporate policies toward the environment and
to change the Peruvian government’s lenient
attitude. LABOR correctly saw the IWT II hearing,
and the attendant national and international
media coverage, as an instrument to bring
about change. In the case of the high altitude
mining study, however, government officials
remain convinced that CMS is not an
occupational disease, and there has been no
organized attempt to use the evidence provided
by the researchers to confront this perception
and identify the need for further action.
This brief was prepared by
Bob Stanley based on a case study
by Fernando Loayza Careaga.
❏ Two main factors account for the LABOR project’s
success at influencing policy: the development
from the outset of a strategy to disseminate the
research results among key national and
international stakeholders, and the ability to
build community support around the issue.
While the high altitude study did publish its
results, there was insufficient follow-up, and
neither the mining community nor the unions
was actively involved in promoting a dialogue
on the causes of CMS.
❏ In both cases, the projects might have had a
greater policy influence if IDRC had had a
framework in place to assess a project’s impact
after its completion. For example, disseminating
LABOR’s study to a broader group of research
institutions supported by IDRC could have had a
great influence on the environmental regulatory
framework in Peru, and possibly in other
mining countries in the region.
❏ Influencing policy is not a spontaneous by-product of good quality research; when a project is part
of a broader strategy to influence policy, its effectiveness improves significantly.
❏ Empowering local communities by providing technical and specialized information breaks through
their isolation and enables them to influence policy.
❏ Careful planning and analysis — from project design to project implementation and dissemination
of results — are needed to close the gap between research and policy.
❏ Small things can make a big difference: providing LABOR with a fax machine enabled them to be in
touch with activist groups nationally and internationally.
Some lessons
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a Canadian public corporation, created to help
developing countries find solutions to the social, economic, and natural resource problems they face. Support is
directed to building an indigenous research capacity. Because influencing the policy process is an important
aspect of IDRC’s work, in 2001 the Evaluation Unit launched a strategic evaluation of more than 60 projects in
some 20 countries to examine whether and how the research it supports influences public policy and decision-
making. The evaluation design and studies can be found at: www.idrc.ca/evaluation/policy
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